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INTRODUCTION

That the declining competitiveness of many large U.S. corporations
can be attributed to their failure to respond to market changes is
axiomatic. In this article, we argue that one of the important causes
of this failure to respond is rooted in the nature of the corporate
governance structure. More specifically, we argue that the governance
structure of many firms is not designed to effectively facilitate the
motivation of the top management in a way that best represents shareholders' interests. Though they legally meet fiduciary responsibilities
to equity holders, boards of directors are often either unwilling or
unable to effectively control the firm in ways which preclude top
management from placing their interests ahead of those of the shareholders or, for that matter, those of other important stakeholders. As
we will demonstrate in this paper, the theoretical and research literature is quite clear regarding this issue; studies show that firms controlled by management are less effective than those in which equity
holders control the firm.'
The public press, too, has taken note of this problem. 2 Some U.S.
firms, such as General Motors (GM), have endured a long, steady

1. The question of who controls the firm is old and an important one. The concept of
ownership rights in the firm through equity holdings is made legitimate by the doctrine of
private property. As a result, stockholders should control the firm. However with wide dispersion
of stockholders and the laws governing the corporation, ultimately control rests with managers.
But how dispersed must the stock be for the owners to lose control? In 1937, the SEC suggested
that 10% stock ownership was sufficient to control the firm. Some research suggests that if a
single equity holder controls as little as 5% of the voting stock, equity holders can have significant
influence on the behavior of managers in the firm. The research divides firms into owner-controlled (OC) and management-controlled (MC) types. Those with at least one equity holder with a
stockholding of at least 5% or more are called owner-controlled (OC). When there is no equity
holder with holdings of at least 5%, the firm is called a management-controlled (MC) firm. In
management-controlled firms, equity holdings are so diluted that the owners cannot exert sufficient control over the managers, giving managers broad discretion to act in their own, not the
stockholders' interests. In an owner-controlled firm the stockholder has the power to align the
incentive structure of management with the owners. For a discussion of the issues regarding
the level of ownership concentration necessary for ownership influence to be exerted, see Herbert
G. Hunt, The Separation of CorporateOwnership and Control: Theory, Evidence, and Implications, 5 J. ACCT. LITERATURE 85-124 (1986). See also Gerald Salancik & Jeffrey Pfeffer, Effects
of Ownership and Performance on Executive Tenure in U. S. Corporations,23 ACAD. MGMT.
J. 653-64 (1980). Salancik and Pfeffer note that while "the exact amount of stock needed to
control a firm effectively is unknown, as is the precise functional relationship between ownership
concentration and control . . . [if] theory predicts differences depending on ownership classification, and a classification is found that is consistent with the theory, then there is reasonable
assurance that the categorization has some validity." Id. at 658.
2. No legal citation is necessary to confirm the salience of this issue. President George
Bush, accompanied by representatives of the largest U.S. automobile manufacturers, recently
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decline in profitability, but failed to replace its Chief Executive Officer
(CEO), Roger Smith. Even when GM started closing plants, the board
of directors did not replace the CEO. 3 In 1990 Time Warner reported
a $227 million loss, yet CEO Steve Ross collected a bonus of $2.075
million, his salary of $800,000, as well as another $400,000 in deferred
4
compensation.
Concurrently, shareholder activism has escalated. For example,
several dissidents won minority representation at Cleveland-Cliffs Inc.
and at Baltimore Bancorp. However, proxy fights may not be a viable
long term solution. The confrontations are risky, time consuming,
more expensive than tender offers and allow no immediate payoff for
won by the
the dissenter. Also, "free riders"5 receive the benefits
6
dissident without providing any financial support.
Entrenched managements have also been assisted in some states
by legislatures which have virtually removed the threat of hostile
takeovers.7 Essentially, this legislation prevents takeover entrepreneurs from entering capital markets with a tender offer, thus rendering
useless one of the forces in the market for corporate control which
can have a disciplining effect, curbing management's opportunistic
behavior. s
This article describes the nature of the problem, both theoretically
and empirically, and one of its fundamental causes, that is the nature
of the corporate governance structure. The first section of the article
examines the separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation from the perspective of the theory of managerial capitalism.
The next section illustrates how owner- versus manager-controlled
firms differ with respect to performance and board composition. Next,
legislative and policy proposals are examined and their potential effects

visited Japan to participate in discussions that he hoped would improve the U.S. automotive
industry's international competitive position. The industry sustained considerable losses in the
past decade and has been forced to lay off workers and close plants. Other U.S. industries,
such as electronics and computing equipment have been similarly affected.
3. Peter Passell, Those Big Executive Salaries May Mask a Bigger Problem, N.Y. TIMES
Apr. 20, 1992, at Al.
4. Graef S. Crystal, The Prince of Pay, FORTUNE, Sept. 30, 1991, at 95.
5. "Free riders" are shareholders other than the dissident in the firm.
6. Judith H. Dobrzynski, Cutting Loose from Shareholder Activists, Bus. WK., July 8,
1991, at 34.
7. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,§ 203 (1983). The Delaware Statute prohibits a stockholder who
purchases fifteen percent or more of a Delaware corporation from engaging in a business combination with that firm for three years unless board approval is obtained prior to the acquisition.
Id.
8. See supra note 6, at 34.
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assessed. Finally, a solution is proposed which requires a fundamental
change in the structure of corporate governance. The proposal is,
essentially, to return control of the firm to shareholders by ensuring
that directors are independent of the CEO. This should result in boards
which are more likely to act in the interests of the shareholders and
which hold the executive more directly responsible for firm performance.

II.

THE SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL

A.

Historical Development

Adam Smith noted that corporations were established so that the
risk of conducting business particularly, foreign commerce, could be
shared by a group of individuals and also because no single individual
possessed the funds needed to finance foreign trade. 9 This business
arrangement, according to Smith, produced owners - shareholders
- who knew relatively little about the operations of their company. 10
Rather, these owners, or shareholders, treated the company as an
investment, focusing on the dividends paid out and relying on directors
to oversee the daily operation of the firm.", Smith observed that these
directors, or managers, who were charged with the responsibility of
running the corporation, did not always do so in the best interests of
the shareholders.12 Shareholders sought to maximize their wealth
through passive investment, but managers, having no personal stake
in the firm, had no incentive to support shareholder objectives.
The pervasiveness and the effects of the separation of ownership
and control in the modern corporation are articulated in the theory
of managerial capitalism 13 and in the Berle-Means Hypothesis.14 The

9.

ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS

10.

Id. at 699.

11.

Id.

690 (Carman ed. 1937).

12.

Smith notes that,
The directors of such companies, however, being the managers rather of other
people's money than of their own, it cannot be well expected, that they should
watch over it with the same vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they
are apt to consider attention to small matters as not for their master's honor, and
very easily give themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence and profusion,
therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of
such a company.
Id. at 700.
13. ROBIN MARRIS, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF MANAGERIAL CAPITALISM 43 (1964).
14.

ADOLPH BERLE, JR.

PRIVATE PROPERTY

& GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND

139 (1932).
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Berle-Means Hypothesis is clearly illustrated in U.S. industry by the
increasing incidence of a wider dispersion of ownership, leading to the
separation of ownership and control and a reduction in the power of
owners to direct the operation of the firm.15 Managers may be motivated to pursue not only personal profit objectives, but also prestige
and power. 16 Thus, goals of management may be quite different from
those of the shareholders. Consequently, the best interests of the
owners will most assuredly not be served when a personal profit-seeking group is in control. 17 This situation prevails even though the law
requires that management must devote attention to business and to
the interests of the corporation and must exhibit reasonable business
prudence.8 While the situation could be reversed if shareholders collaborate to become a majority interest, 19 typically that dissatisfied
equity holders simply sell their shares.
One way that management's self-seeking interests are often served
is through efforts to expand the size of the firm. In fact, one commentator has noted that "size rather than the industry as such is responsible for the observed industrial differences in compensation" between
executives in firms controlled by managers and firms controlled by
owners. 20 But this is not usually an unbridled search to maximize their

Id. at 120. Berle and Means also note that,
When the owner was also in control of his enterprises he could operate it in his
own interest and the philosophy surrounding the institution of private property
has assumed that he would do so. This assumption has been carried over to present
conditions and it is still expected that enterprise will be operated in the interests
of the owners. But have we any justification for assuming that those in control of
a modern corporation will choose to operate it in the interests of the owners? The
answer to this question will depend on the degree to which the self-interest of
those in control may run parallel to the interests of ownership and, insofar as they
differ, on the checks on the use of power which may be established by political,
economic, or social conditions.
Id. at 121.
16. Id. at 139.
17. Id. at 122.
18. Id. at 235. Alan R. Parmiter, Reshaping the Corporate Fiduciary Model: A Director's
Duty of Independence, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1353, 1351-1464. "It is a fundamental principle of
corporate law that directors owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to their corporation and
its body of shareholders." See also DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 8, § 141 (b) (1983); MODEL BUSINESS
CORP. ACT § 8.03 (1984). Officers of the corporation are appointed by the directors and oversee
the daily operation of the company. See e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 8, § 142 (1983); REV. MODEL
15.

BUSINESS CORP. ACT

19.
20.

§§ 8.40-8.41 (1984).

Berle & Means, supra note 14, at 277.
DAVID R. ROBERTS, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 45 (1959).
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self-interests without some regard for shareholder wealth. 2 1 They seek
to ensure that profits are high enough to placate stockholders, but
are concerned with maximizing total revenue - not necessarily owner
returns. This behavior is undeniably unexceptable from the point of
view of the stockholder, and, worse, entrenches management since no
dire cause for concern is apparent.- Another commentator similarly
noted that "managers pursue organizational size and growth because
of the power, salary, status, and security that come with attaining
these objectives. '"Such growth strategies divert funds from competing projects including the issuance of dividends that may otherwise yield a greater
return on investment. Continued diversion of funds from profitable
ventures to growth objectives will eventually cause the rate of return
to the firm to fall. When this happens, the firm's stock price will fall
and the firm will be vulnerable to takeover. The threat of takeover
- and the subsequent loss of a personal income stream - forces the
manager to maintain a minimally acceptable level of return and to
'
keep share prices in a "safe region.'M
B.

The Empirical Evidence

Empirical evidence supports the assertion that, given different
objectives of owners and managers, the performance and practices of
owner-controlled firms differ from those of manager-controlled firms.
With the link between firm size and executive pay, managers have
incentives to cause the firm to grow, often beyond the optimal size
of the firm.2 The growth permits managers to increase the resources
under their control, increase their compensation, and increase their
ability to reward middle managers through promotion. 26 However,

21.

WILLIAM

J. BAUMOL,

BUSINESS BEHAVIOR, VALUE AND GROWTH

43 (1959). Baumol

notes that,
In recent years the managers of large firms have displayed signs of a desire for
respectability and security. To avoid difficulties with the public regulatory authorities as well as with their own stockholders, managements have veered away
from the rough and tumble. . . . In some cases I have seen the possibility of
competitive countermoves considered as a sort of breach of etiquette. ...
Id. at 30.
22. Id. at 50.
23. WILLIAM A. MCEACHERN, MANAGERIAL CONTROL AND PERFORMANCE 9 (1975).
24. Id. at 43.
25. Michael Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, CorporateFinance, and Takeovers,
76 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 323-29 (1988).
26. Id. at 323.
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suboptimal size means suboptimal returns to owners. A study of 500
U.S. manufacturing firms revealed that, consistent with the predictions of "managerial models, owner-controlled firms' rate of return
are higher and more variable than the returns on managerial-controlled
firms ... the industry membership effect on individual firm rates of
return, risk, and size is significant . . .across all classifications, risk
and return are systematically and positively related.127 Other empirical
evidence shows that owner-controlled firms are more profitable than
manager-controlled firms.2 This is likely due to the higher level of
monitoring of management and greater alignment of managerial incentives with owners' interests in owner-controlled firms.- Higher levels
of monitoring and compensation alignment should lead to higher firm
30
performance.
C.

The Principle-Agent Problem

Principle-Agent Theory frames this issue of divergent interests in
the anagement of large corporations. The shareholders of a firm are
the residual claimants for its profits, hence it is in the best interest
of the shareholder to maximize the profits of a firm. When a firm is
not acting to maximize profits, the cause may be attributable to the
separation of ownership and control.1 In such a case, a principle-agent
problem exists. Both the principle and the agent are assumed to be
utility maximizers and will endeavor to pursue their own respective
objectives.3 2 The agent (the manager) takes certain unobservable action
on behalf of a principle (the shareholders) that result in an observable
outcome (profits). In the principle-agent context, there is a basic incentive problem: the agent's objectives are not aligned with those of the
principle, resulting in residual losses to the agent. One solution is to
reward the agent with a fixed percentage of the profits so that there
is no longer an incentive to make suboptimal decisions.3 Then,
decisions that maximize the agent's personal profit similarly maximize

27. Kenneth J. Boudreaux, Managerialism and Risk-Return Performance, 39 S. ECON. J.
368-69, 366-72 (1973).
28. Id. at 369.
29. Henry L. Tosi & Luis R. Gomez-Mejia, The Decoupling of CEO Pay and Performance:
An Agency Theory Perspective, 34 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 179, 169-89 (1989).
30. Id. at 169.

31.

JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION

35 (1988).

32. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 308, 305-60 (1976).
33. Id.
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the principle's profit.- A second solution is that the principle incur
monitoring costs to ensure, within limits, that the agent is indeed
making decisions in the best interest of the principle.M Similarly, the
agent may post a bond to guarantee that he will not pursue actions
that will be harmful to the principle.M
Monitoring expenditures by the principle, the bonding expenditures
by the agent, and the residual loss that results from the failure to
perfectly align principle and agent interests are defined as agency
costs.2 7 However, even if the principle is willing to incur agency costs
of monitoring, it may still be difficult to effectively control agents.
For example, a characteristic of many managerial situations is the
executive team. In team production, it is difficult to ascertain if
an agent is shirking since his effort may not be separable from the
efforts of others.3 In such an instance, monitoring may be difficult or
impossible 9 Additionally, "[t]here may be uncertainty about the tasks
(or the value of the tasks) that any member of the organization will
be undertaking, about his(her) ability to undertake these tasks, and
0
about the way in which he(she) will or has undertaken these tasks.'4
Monitoring is also problematic when the agent's action does not
completely determine the outcome. 41 What action is optimal for a given
set of circumstances is unclear. Furthermore, several actions may
yield the same optimal result. As such, no standard against which to
measure the appropriateness of an agent's actions exists.
The problems of moral hazard (hidden action) and adverse selection
42
(hidden information) further complicates the monitoring process.
Moral hazard refers to the actions (or inactions) carried out by the

34. This explanation of the agency relationship assumes that both the agent and the principle
are risk-neutral. When one or both parties are risk averse, a more involved incentive structure
is required. See TIROLE, supra note 31, at 36 for a technical discussion.
35. See supra note 32, at 308.
36. See supra note 32, at 308.
37. See supra note 32, at 308-09.
38. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 779, 777-95 (1972).
39. Id. at 779. "Two men jointly lift heavy cargo into trucks. Solely by observing the total
loaded per day, it is impossible to determine each person's marginal productivity. With team
production it is difficult, solely by observing total output, to either define or determine each
individual's contribution to this output of the cooperating inputs." Id.
40. James A. Mirrlees, The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority Within an
Organization, 7 BELL J. ECON. 107, 105-31 (1976).
41. Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Agency, in PRINCIPLES AND AGENTS: THE
STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 37, 37-51 (Pratt & Zechhauser, eds., 1985).
42. Id. at 38.
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agent which are unobservable by the principle. Adverse selection addresses the problems of information asymmetry. In this situation, the
agent has more information with respect to the optimal choice of action
than does the principle. Hence, the principle is unable to evaluate the
agent's action since the proper action is unknown.
These agency problems, however, are eventually resolved by market forces. Inefficient firms and managers will be disciplined, and
agency costs will be reduced in the long run. But, in the short run,
which may extend over a long number of years, inefficiencies and
losses arising from management control and intransigence are unnecessary. For example, many believe that the U.S. automobile industry
has begun to be more competitive with foreign manufacturers after
years of difficulty. The industry lost its world leadership and led to
disastrous effects in the manufacturing sector of the economy. The
market did, indeed, work. Nevertheless, we contend that the response
of the industry should have - and would have - been quicker had
the top management of those firms been less entrenched. If their
employment and income had been more contingent on firm performance, we believe the current situation would have been very different.
III.

SOME PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

A.

Suggested Regulation

There is no doubt that costs of such management failures to respond
to market forces are borne by equity holders and other stakeholders
while the top management of the firm appears to be insulated from
negative effects. For this reason management faces growing pressure
to be more accountable and less free to extract high compensation
from firms when performance is low. One suggested approach to accomplish this is through legislation of CEO compensation. Congress
and the Securities and Exchange Commission have introduced proposals to limit compensation levels and to promote shareholder participation in executive pay decisions. One proposal limits the amount of
executive compensation that firms may deduct as a business expense
to twenty-five times the amount of the lowest paid employee. Another
approach directly prohibits the deduction of executive compensation
in excess of $1 million.48
Our thesis is that the matter is better resolved through modifications in the corporate governance process, an area of much current

43.

JANET FUERSICH

&

BARRY COSLOY, EXECUTIVE

UNDER FIRE, BENEFITS BRIEFING

COMPENSATION

(Coopers & Lybrand, eds. 1992).

PRACTICES
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controversy.Y It is doubtful that legislation of the type proposed is
likely to increase managerial accountability and may serve only to
limit that form of compensation which it covers. Outcomes not envisaged by some of the legislative proposals could be equally problematic.
Consider the instance of Michael Eisner, the CEO of The Walt Disney
Company: since many Disney employees earn the current minimum
wage ($4.25 per hour), his annual income, based on a forty hour work
week, would be approximately $221,000 if legislation limited CEO pay
to that twenty-five times the amount of the lowest paid employee.
Under Eisner's direction, Disney's reported earnings increased from
$98 million in 1984 to $824 million in 1990 while Eisner's income for
those six years totaled over $100 million. 45 Without debating the merits
of either salary level, most would agree that given the lower salary,
there would be very limited alignment of managerial and owners'
interests. Similarly, legislation regarding information disclosure may
not be practical. Since management is responsible for the information
disclosure, they can exercise discretion in the compilation and presentation of such information, effectively exploiting information asymmetries.
While there is no current evidence regarding the precise unintended
and undesirable consequences of the proposed compensation legislation, the results of research on the effects of state legislation restricting
takeovers is illustrative. This legislation appears to have exacerbated
the problem it was trying to remedy. The wave of "so-called second
generation antitakeover statutes [permitted] managers to stage
takeover defenses not envisaged in the original corporate charter,
thereby helping to preserve their income streams at the expense of
shareholder wealth. ' 46 Thus, these laws actually harm stockholders.47

44. Richard M. Buxbaum, The Internal Division of Powers in Corporate Governance, 73
CAL. L. REV., 1732, 1671-1734 (1985) notes that,
State corporation law is in a state of flux, partly caused by, and partly a cause
of, a crisis of nerve. In the central sector of shareholder governance rights, traditional enabling-law philosophy, excessively aggressive efficiency rationales, and
powerfully focused managerialist strategy have combined to weaken an already
inarticulate faith in the primacy of owner over manager.
See also Richard M. Buxbaum, CorporateLegitimacy, Economic Theory, and Legal Doctrine,
45 OHIO ST. L.J., 515, 517, 541-42 (1984).
45. Rita Koselka, Mickey's Midlife Crisis, FORBES, May 13, 1991, at 42.
46. Richard N. Langlois, Contract, Competition, and Efficiency, 55 BROOK. L. REV., 831,
831-52 (1989).
47. Stephen Mahle, Proxy Contests, Agency Costs, and Third GenerationState Antitakeover
Statutes, J. CORP. L., 760, 721-61 (1990) states that,
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This legislation effectively quelled one of the disciplining forces of the
market on management, and, more specifically, on the boards of directors. 8
However, neither do we believe that it is most efficacious to leave
the resolution to markets, given the current state of corporate governance laws in the United States. In the ideal world of theoretical
economic models, most would agree that competition in markets generally leads to efficient outcomes, but that the breakdown of that
competition results in inefficient bargains between management and
shareholders. 49 Typically, such bargains do not optimally utilize shareholder assets and stock prices decline as shareholders divest the stock
in favor of a more lucrative portfolio. As the stock becomes undervalued, share prices drop and equity holders may be forced to take
lower prices when selling the stock. Takeover attempts will result
with an increase in the rise in the stock price of the acquired firm.
Such a response is taken to mean that investors believe that a new
management team will improve the firm performance over the old
management team. 5° Evidence exists that shows substantial increases
in productivity after both leveraged buyouts and management buyouts. 51 Thus, markets forces eventually compel inefficient firms toward
efficiency, but at what we believe to be at very high costs, which, we
contend, can be reduced substantially with changes in corporate governance as we propose below.

Economic analysis of state antitakeover laws indicates that the recent proliferation
of Just-Say-No laws harm stockholders of corporations that are chartered in JustSay-No states. These statutes prohibit hostile tender offers and force would-be
tender offerors to attempt to gain control of corporations by using proxy fights.
Proxy fights are difficult to win, and even when proxy dissidents are successful,
the resulting management team has the propensity to subject stockholders to higher
post-control-change agency costs than do successful tender offerors.
48. See supra note 5, at 34.
49. See supra note 63, at 832; see also Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Reibstein, The Contract
Clause and the Corporation, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 767 (1989); Frank Easterbrook & Daniel
Fischel, The ProperRole of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV.
L. REV. 1161, 1180-82, 1203 n.122 (1981).
50. KENNETH M. DAVIDSON, MEGAMERGERS: CORPORATE AMERICA'S BILLION-DOLLAR
TAKEOVERS 283 (1985); see also Michael Jensen & Richard Ruback, The Market for Corporate
Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 11-13, 5-50 (1983).
51. Frank R. Lichtenberg & Donald Siegle, The Effects of Leveraged Buyouts on Productivity and Related Aspects of Firm Behavior, Discussion Paper, U.S. Department of Commerce,
Bureau of the Census, 1989.
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Alternative Policy Proposals

Many believe that more legislation of corporate governance is not
necessary, that these problems can be resolved by more responsible
actions within the firm. Such advocates have proposed policy recommendations which utilize existing, internal processes to control managers. 52 Three such proposals are discussed below.
Proposal 1. Link Managerial Compensation and Performance
Research shows that the pay of chief executives is related to firm
performance, but the relationship is not a strong one.5 Further, the
link between pay and performance may be even weaker when managers, not owners, control firms. CEO base pay in management-controlled firms tends to be more strongly related to organization size, but
when owners control the firm, performance has significant effects on
base pay.-, CEO bonuses and long term income, however, are both
related to performance in management-controlled firms as well as
owner-controlled firms. Evidence indicates that management-controlled firms have a greater propensity than do owner-controlled firms to
merge and acquire.- Thus, one can infer that the design of incentive
structures of management-controlled firms motivates managerial behavior to maximize firm size rather than profitability, which promotes
the managements' own interests.- Therefore, CEO's in managementcontrolled firms have less performance risk thaA CEO's in owner-controlled firms. In management-controlled firms, the policies which govern bonus and long term income of CEO's are structured to reduce

52. Murray Weidenbaum & Stephen Vogt, The Pot Versus the Kettle, 30 CHALLENGE
59-60, 56-60 (1987).
53. John Deckop, Twenty-five Years of Executive Compensation: A Look Back and Suggestions for the Future, Paper presented at the Southern Academy of Management, New Orleans,
LA, 1987.
54. Luis R. Gomez-Mejia, Henry L. Tosi & Timothy Hinkin, ManagerialControl, Performance and Executive Compensation, 30 ACAD. MGMT. J. 62, 51-70 (1987).
55. Roger Blair & David Kaserman, Ownership and Control in Modern Organizations, 11
J. Bus. RES. 337, 333-44 (1983).
56. There are other reasons that the "size/pay" relationship which enhance management
interests as a result of growth and acquisition. Acquisitions help managers diversify their employment risk. An investor may diversify risk by investing in several firms. A manager, like
other employees, cannot easily diversify his or her human capital which may be invested in the
single firm of employment. See Yakov Ahimud & Baruch Lev, Risk Reduction as a managerial
Motive for Conglomerate Mergers, 12 BELL J. ECON. 605-17 (1981). Acquisition and merger
might lead to less variable income and, with the further effects of income smoothing discussed
in the next section, decrease the risk associated with losing the job.
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pay variability and downside risk, and to have a shorter term orientation than in owner-controlled firms. Thus, managers in manager-con57
trolled firms appear able to pursue their own objectives.
Management-controlled firms clearly designed compensation
systems to avoid the vagaries of fluctuating performance .
. . . [E]xecutives in management controlled firms appear to
have the best of both worlds. Their basic salaries were a
function of firms' size, a relatively stable factor, their long
term incomes were greater when performance was good and
the scale of their organizations provided a downside hedge
against poor performance.8
Proposal 2.

Improve Financial Reporting to Facilitate
Shareholder Influence

The SEC has issued directives that require firms to publish shareholder proposals regarding executive compensation and to directly
disclose executive compensation in proxy statements. An additional
directive requires the Financial Accounting Standards Board to investigate valuation procedures for stock options included in executive
compensation plans. 59 More accurate and timely financial reporting
would allow the equity holder to better monitor investment decisions
and understand more about top management compensation. However,
the evidence shows that the financial reporting practices of management-controlled firms and owner-controlled firms differ in ways which
create an information disadvantage for the equity holders in managercontrolled firms. Management-controlled firms are more likely than
owner-controlled firms (1) to report financial data in the best possible
light,so (2) to use inventory methods and other accounting practices
which overstate earnings, and (3) utilize income smoothing strategies
which will minimize the appearance of earnings variability. 61 In one
study of market reactions to tender offers, researchers found that
equity holders in management-controlled firms realized merger anticipation premiums in the market prices of their holdings much later
than equity holders in owner-controlled firms.62 Managers of manage57.
58.
59.
60.

See supra note 71, at 62.
Id. at 65.
See supra note 43.
Herbert G. Hunt, The Separation of Corporate Ownership and Control: Theory, Evidence, and Implications, 5 J. ACCT. LITERATURE 114-15, 85-124 (1986).
61. Id. at 117-18.
62. In-Mu Haw, Steven Lilien, & Victor Pastena, Market Reactions to Tender Offers for
Owner-Controlled Versus Manager-Controlled Firms, Unpublished Paper, Baruch College,
CUNY, 1987.
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ment-controlled firms appear to be motivated to restrict the leakage
of information about tender offers to protect their position by, perhaps,
discouraging the tender and potential future tenders.
Proposal 3.

Demand More Responsible Actions by Boards

The standard demand is that boards meet their fiduciary responsibility. However, this demand fails to consider that management-controlled firms and owner-controlled firms exhibit different patterns of
board influence. The board of directors functions as the monitor of a
firm's top executives.6 They are charged by the shareholders to ensure
that shareholder interests are represented and that managerial opportunism is curtailed.4 The board hires and fires the CEO and the
board's compensation committee determines the CEO's pay package.
Yet in management controlled firms, boards of directors seem to either
lack the power or the incentive to structure the compensation process
in ways to discipline the management to act more strongly in shareholders' interests. Researchers have shown that in manager-controlled
firms, the CEO was the most influential participant in the CEO pay
setting process but that in owner-controlled firms, there was more
influence over CEO pay by major stockholders and by the boards of
directors.- Other research shows that firms that provided golden
parachutes- for their CEO's tended to have a relatively higher dispersion of stock ownership, a higher tenure of the CEO relative to the
board, and a higher proportion of external directors on their boards. 7
Whenever there is a high dispersion of stock ownership and high CEO
tenure, CEO's are likely to significantly influence board-management
relationships.In part, the lack of board influence in management controlled firms
may stem from the fact that there are social, not economic, consider-

63. Eugene F. Fama & Michael Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 311, 301-25 (1983).
64. Id. at 311.
65. See supra note 29, at 179-80.
66. Golden parachutes are incentive packages for incumbent managers as insurance against
the possibility of takeover. Given a manager's interest in retaining his position, a golden
parachute provides (usually) a lucrative incentive for the CEO should an attractive takeover
proposal emerge. In this way, the manager can act in the shareholders' best interest since the
value of the parachute offsets the value of his current position. However, some believe that a
golden parachute is nothing more than insurance against incompetence. See A. M. Morrison,
Those Executive Bailout Deals, FORTUNE, Dec. 13, 1982, at 82-87.
67. Harbir Singh & Farid Harianto, Management-BoardRelationships, Takeover Risk, and
the Adoption of Golden Parachutes, 32 ACAD. MGMT. J. 20, 7-24 (1989).
68. Id. at 24.
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ations which play an important role in board deliberations. 69 One study
found CEO's were more likely to receive a golden parachute when
they had longer tenure in the firm relative to the tenure of members
of the board. 70 Researchers concluded that the CEO is more likely to
have appointed board members who perceive the golden parachutes
as a reciprocal obligation.71 Thus, CEO's may enhance or solidify power
by influencing the board selection process.72 This leads to the inevitable
conclusion that, at least in manager-controlled firms, the process of
setting the terms of CEO compensation is circular and one in which
the locus of control is quite clear. "[I]n most cases board members
are handpicked by management. In many practical respects, then,
management is, therefore, in control of the board."7 So,
In practice, contrary to the basic tenets of the [compensation]
model procedure, the chief executive often has his hand in
the pay setting process almost from the first step. He generally approves, or at least knows about, the recommendation of his personnel executive before it goes to the compensation committee, and may take a pre-game pass at the consultant's recommendation, too. Both (personnel executives
and consultants) rely upon the good graces of the chief executive for their livelihood. The consultant in particular - who
is typically hired by management - would like to be invited
for a return engagement. The board's compensation commitoperate independently of the chief executive
tee doesn't
4
either.7
Thus, the research shows that boards of directors act in ways
consistent with the power distribution of the firm. When there is a
powerful stockholder, the board is more likely to behave in ways to
further owners' interests; when there is not a powerful stockholder,
the board seems to act in the managers' interests. This predisposition
implies that management-controlled firms, unchecked by boards, do
not operate in the best interests of the shareholders.

69. James Wade, Charles A. O'Reilly, III & Ike Chandratat, Golden Parachutes: CEO's
and the Exercise of Social Influence, 35 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 601, 587-603 (1990).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Jeffrey Pfeffer, Size and Composition of Corporate Boards of Directors, 17 ADMIN.
Sci. Q. 220, 218-28 (1972).
74. Monci Jo Williams, Why Chief Executives' Pay Keeps Rising, FORTUNE, Apr. 1, 1985,
at 66-76.
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An Alternative Solution

These proposals are, indeed, a reasoned call for ethical and legal
behavior by both boards and managers of firms. But the evidence is
clear that they are likely to fail because they do not address a crucial
75
dimension of the problem: the organizational control structure. If
shareholders are disenfranchised, management has an opportunity to
act in a self-interested manner.76 Effectively, the argument is, owners
lose control in very large organizations when equity holdings are so
broadly dispersed that they cannot easily form coalitions and exert
control over managers.7 Thus, managers insulated from stockholder
constraints and market pressures will have broad discretion. 7s If managers' objectives differ from owners' objectives, managers' actions are
likely to deviate from profit-maximization behaviors toward those consistent with their own self-interest.
Given the close link between the power distribution in the firm
and the propensity of boards to support either shareholder or management interests, managerial influence on the board should be minimized.
Managers often influence board selection through modification of the
rules on terms of office, the nomination of candidates, and voting
procedures. These policies can make it difficult for owners of companies
with widely distributed equity holdings to exert much influence on
79
boards and managements.
In the current governance context, equity holders cannot exert
influence. Currently, dissatisfied investors have limited choices. If
they disapprove of their firm's management, but are unable to form
an effective coalition with others, their alternatives are to (1) wait
until management improves profitability, (2) hope for a serious
takeover attempt, or (3) dispose of their stocks. These may be perfectly
acceptable alternatives for some, but those investors who may want
to exercise ownership rights should not be forced into this passive
mode by an entrenched management by virtue of ownership diffusion
and corporate bylaws. We reject the convenient theoretical argument
that shareholders prefer to be passive investors who spread their risk
through personal portfolio diversification rather than through the in-

75.
able to
76.
77.
78.
79.

The organizational control structure refers to the extent to which equity holders are
influence organizational policies.
See supra note 12, at 139.
See supra note 12, at 139.
WILLIAM A. MCEACHERN, MANAGERIAL CONTROL AND PERFORMANCE 41 (1975).
Id.
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fluence of firm policy and strategy. Although some investors choose
to assume a passive role, an increasing number wish to exercise ownership rights, as shown in the Delaware Supreme Court decision in
the Time/Warner/Paramount case.80
Some believe that the Time/Warner/Paramount decision places
much more power in the hands of directors, at the expense of investors,
even in light of the nature of board fiduciary responsibility. State
corporate statutes entrust the management of a corporation's business
activity and affairs to the board of directors8 defining the fiduciary
responsibility to the corporation and its shareholders. 8 2 The Supreme
Court of Delaware, in Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc.,defined the scope of directors' duties in an auction to be more than
simply obtaining the highest price. The court held the Macmillan Board
of Directors liable for failing to oversee the entire auction process and
prevent self-interested management from unfairly influencing the auction.84 Even in light of this ruling, boards can remain within the boundaries of legal interpretation while still placing managerial interest
over those of equity holders, for all the reasons noted earlier in this
paper.
We believe there is a solution which is superior to the proposed
legislation and policy recommendations. Owners must be given more
control over board selection reduce managerial control, which would
make boards more responsive to owners' interests. Removing management from the process of selecting board members would accomplish
this. The creation of independent offices or agents to manage the
election of directors for publicly traded firms frees equity holders from
the influence of management. These independent offices could make
relevant performance information available to equity holders, could
facilitate coalitions of stockholders, and could generally enhance owner
involvement. Equity holding managers would have rights similar to
those afforded other stockholders in terms of proposing and advocating
candidates for board membership.
This alternative would require federal legislation mandating that
publicly traded firms establish independent offices or agents outside

80. Bill Saporito, The Inside Story of Time Warner," FORTUNE, Nov. 20,1989, at 164-210.
81. WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS
AND DIRECTORS

§ 2.01, at 37 (4th ed. 1988). For relevant state statutes, see

DEL. CODE

ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1983); CAL. CORP. CODE § 300 (West 1990).

82.

See Harry G. Henn,

83.
84.

559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989).
Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1279-80 (Del. 1989).
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§ 234, at 621 (3rd ed. 1983).
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the firm to conduct director elections. The independent agent could
be, for example, a public accounting firm, a law firm, or another
organization specifically created for the purpose of protecting shareholder ownership rights. The board of directors for a given firm could
choose an outside agent, subject to the constraint that the agent not
have other business or professional relationships with that firm. The
independent office would solicit slates for board election from stockholders. To minimize the number of slates, but still provide opportunities for choice, some minimum percentage of stock (e.g., one percent) must be held by individuals or coalitions nominating candidates
for the board.
The management group could also nominate a single slate, to ensure
that the current managerial competence and knowledge be represented
in the election. Beyond that, the management of the firm would be
permitted to participate in the election to the extent that they meet
the same holdings requirements as other equity holders. Information
about the proposals and programs of each nominated candidate or
slate could be distributed in much the same fashion as under current
practice, perhaps even in a more simplified form. The equity holders
will then select board members who advocate positions congruent with
their own interests. The independent office will also disseminate other
information to equity holders. Newsletters, for example, could contain
proposals which might have utility to the larger population of stockholders, or could serve as an informal forum through which equity
holders may communicate.
This alternative should also include provisions for arbitration or
mediation in the event that equity holders who do not control the
legal minimum for slate nomination have grievances, thereby limiting
the need for expensive legal action as equity holders seek to take
advantage of ownership rights.
IV.
A.

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

The Further Intrusion of Non-Market Forces into the Private
Sector

Our proposal represents a departure from the current, general
practice of board selection in the United States. Although this approach strengthens boards and seeks to align firm decisions with shareholder interests, there are still problems that must be resolved in the
development and implementation of legislation. Even though there is
already substantial regulation of business, this proposal may minimize
the need for more complex regulation.
The question is not, "Should there be regulation?" Rather it is,
"What kind of legislation makes the best sense?" We believe that our
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proposal, implemented, is (1) far less intrusive in capital markets, (2)
is a positive, rather than a negative approach to the separation of
ownership and control dilemma, and (3) will provide stronger internal
pressures for more efficiency and increased productivity. If boards
begin to hold management more accountable, then forces within the
firm would drive it toward efficiency. This would reduce the severe
and costly adjustment "shocks" often associated with restructuring in
order to achieve increased productivity.
B.

The Specific Form of Regulation

In this paper we have outlined only the general boundaries of the
proposal. There are many other specific matters to be resolved. For
instance, should the requirement of independent election be applied
to presently regulated firms, such as public utilities? What should the
minimum holding requirement be in order for shareholders to nominate
candidates for board membership?
C.

Resistance by Current Management

The current management of firms will, no doubt, oppose our proposal. It would reduce their control over the board and increase their
dependence upon it. Managers will most likely contend that they are
best informed about problems of the firm and are therefore best equipped to solve those problems and to do so in the best interest of equity
holders, hence they should continue to play a strong hand in selection
of the board.
While it is true that management, generally, is well informed about
problems, it does not necessarily follow that it is best suited to solve
those problems or that solutions would be in the best interests of the
owners. If, indeed, that were the case, there would be far fewer
takeover attempts since assets would be more efficiently managed and
less concern about the current levels of CEO pay. We would add that,
there would be for managements that do work in the owners' interest,
our proposal should have only minimal effects. Boards are not likely
to replace executives who have managed effectively.
D.

Additional, Unnecessary Costs Are Unlikely

The costs of independent elections must be paid by the firm. However, it is possible that the aggregate increased costs would be far
less than those which would be incurred with more complex regulatory
legislation or those agency costs currently incurred. Further, since
independent elections will shift the distribution of power in the firm
to owners, one can expect a reduction in monitoring and in the agency
costs incurred by the separation of ownership and control.
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The magnitude of costs associated with this proposal is not expected
to be excessive, especially since firms already incur costs to meet
current requirements of director selection. The difference is that these
costs will be paid to external agents. More likely, incremental costs
associated with the independent office will be offset by the increases
in profitability and productivity that accompany greater accountability.
There may be some increased regulatory costs, though even that is
not certain.
E.

The Determination of Suitable Independent Agents

We have suggested that public accounting firms, or law firms,
could be designated as executors of the independent selection of board
members. Other alternatives, such as an ombudsman-like office, could
be considered. In this approach, a mission-specific office is created
that is directly responsible to the board and has access to adequate
resources to execute the election, disseminate information, and facilitate shareholder interests. Disputes between this office and management, or stockholders, could be subject to arbitration or mediation.
V.

SUMMARY

There is evidence and theory which supports the argument that
the current state of compensation of the highest levels of management
in U. S. corporations can be accounted for, in part, by the fact that
equity holders are not influential in the control of the firm. This permits
managers to act in ways to further their own self-interest at the
expense of equity holders. In the current legal environment, equity
holders are often powerless in the firm and their main option is to
dispose of their equity. A change in corporate governance practice is
proposed which would increase owner influence. This change is to
remove the firm's management from control of the process of board
selection, assigning that role to independent agents. The effect, it is
argued, would be to increase the dependence of the management on
the owners, leading to a stronger profit maximization strategy.

